





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


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REMARKS

ON THE

LETTER

ADDRESSED TO

TWO GREAT MEN.

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REMARKS

ON THE

LETTER

ADDRESSED TO

TWO GREAT MEN.

In a LETTER to the

AUTHOR of that PIECE.

*Vis consilii expers mole ruit sua:
Vim temperatam di quoque provebunt
In majus: idem odere vires
Omne nefas animo moventes.*

HOR.

L O N D O N:

Printed in the Year MDCCLX.

Price Eight Pence.

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REMARKS

ON THE

LETTER

ADDRESSED TO

TWO GREAT MEN.

SIR,

I SHALL not inquire who is the Author of the Piece on which I am going to remark. Your Opinions, and your Arguments, are all that I shall consider. Whether you are, or ever have been * pensioned and employed, whether you are merely a private Man, or a Person distinguished in Rank and Fortune, you are to me, and to the Public, on this Occasion, only the Author of the Letter to Two Great Men; and you will give me leave to address you in that and in no other Light. It is indeed a Light in which you cannot be viewed to your Disadvantage; your Piece is animated with the Spirit of true Patriotism; it discovers political and historical Knowledge; and it is written throughout with Fire and Energy.

But, Sir, that Animation of Language and Sentiment, which is allowed to the Orator in political Conflicts *in pulvere et in sole*, has no Place in a sober Discussion. I write not to the Ear or to the Pas-

* Vid. p. 2. of the Letter.

sions;

sions; I aim at no Seduction of Judgment; and I ask for no Approbation but what a calm Reflection and unprejudiced Reason may afford me. My End is, rather to examine the Justness of your Plan, than to enforce any Plan of my own; and I shall not affect the Flow, nor the Pomp, nor the high-colouring of parliamentary Declamation. If I can deliver a plain Argument in plain Language, it is all I aim at: For this I shall make no Apology; that Freedom with which you warn the Ministry against falling into Mistakes in the ensuing Treaty of Peace, will justify me to you, and to the World, if I should attempt to point out some of those Mistakes, into which I imagine you are yourself fallen.

You cannot be ignorant in what manner Success operates upon the Minds of Men; with what a blind and haughty Confidence it inspires them; and in the insolent Elation of Victory, how little they attend to Reason or Justice, and often to their own most important Interests. People of all Nations imagine, that when they are worsted, Success gives their Enemy very little Right to prescribe severe Terms; and conceive when they are themselves successful, that there are no Bounds to their own Pretensions. If this Disposition should happen at this Time to prevail amongst us, it may be attended with very pernicious Consequences. It may raise such extravagant Expectations, or excite such wrong-placed Desires, as will render a Negotiation for Peace a Work of infinite Difficulty. A virtuous and able Ministry may, in some Sort, find their Virtue and Ability brought to act against themselves; they may find that their Victories and Successes have excited so much Arrogance in those who had no Share in acquiring them, as to destroy all their Effects; they may find their Virtue and Moderation over-ruled by the Madness of the People, and be thus disabled

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abled from availing themselves of a successful War, in the Attainment of an advantageous Peace.

I am afraid, Sir, that your Letter tends to increase and inflame this improper Disposition. You are not to be blamed for delivering your Sentiments openly. The Liberty of an Englishman; and your own Abilities, give you a Right to do so. What I blame is your excessive Attachment to certain Objects, so excessive, that if they should not be insisted upon by the Ministry, with a Warmth equal to your own, you hesitate not to declare to the People, * *that we shall have a treacherous and delusive Peace.* This, Sir, is surely a most unjustifiable Method of proceeding; it is to sow the Seeds of general Discontent in favour of your particular Opinions; Opinions, which if they are not ill founded, are at least very problematical: I cannot help observing, that your Resentment against the Perfidy of the Enemy, has made you seem much more intent upon affronting France, than providing deliberately for the Interests of *Britain.*

You set forth, with great Strength of Fact and Reason, the Treachery of *France*, and her frequent Violations of the most solemn Treaties. You insist particularly on the Case of *Dunkirk*: and I admit that you could not have chosen a more proper Instance. But I am sorry to see that you are even here guided more by old Prejudices than by the true Nature of Things; and that you have proposed such a *Manner* of acting, that whilst we are in reality only demanding our honest and unquestionable Rights, we may have all the Appearance of acting with the most wanton Insolence, with the most hateful Oppression.

You propose to the Two Great Men, that,

* Vid. p. 29. of the Letter.

“ before

“ * before they enter upon any new Treaty, or listen
 “ to any plausible Proposal whatever, they ought to
 “ insist that Justice may be done with regard to for-
 “ mer Treaties ; shew France the solemn Engagements
 “ she entered into at Utrecht to demolish Dunkirk.
 “ Demand,” say you, “ immediate Justice on that Ar-
 “ ticle, as a preliminary Proof of her Sincerity in the
 “ ensuing Negotiation. Tell them, with the Firmness
 “ of wise Conquerors, that the Demolition of Dun-
 “ kirk is what you are intitled to by Treaties made
 “ long ago and violated, and that it shall not be so
 “ much as mentioned in the ensuing Negotiation, but
 “ complied with before that Negotiation shall com-
 “ mence.”

Though this is a Sort of Language hitherto, I believe, unheard in *Europe*, why you confine it to *Dunkirk* I cannot imagine. Why would you not have them in the same *previous* Manner renounce all Right to the disputed Parts of *America*? You will, I hope, allow, that the *French* Encroachments there, are as much against the Faith of Treaties, as the Restoration of *Dunkirk*; and that we have full as good a Right to expect every Reparation of Interest and Honour with regard to the one as to the other. But if all Points wherein the Violation of Treaties is charged, ought not, according to your Doctrine, to be so much as mentioned in the ensuing Negotiation, but ought to be settled before that Negotiation shall commence, the Business of the Congress will be so very short, and so very easy, as to require no wonderful Share of that Knowledge, that Adroitness, and all that Combination of Talents, and Virtues, which you demand in a Plenipotentiary; but which you are almost in Despair of finding among our Nobility. To speak and to act to the Letter of the Instructions which you give him, in-

* Vid. p. 24. 25.

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stead of all those Qualifications, he need only assume a decisive and dictatorial Tone; to rail abundantly at those employed by the Enemy to treat with him; to remind them of their amazing Perfidy *; to tell them that he owes them a Disgrace †; to tell them that he can have no Dealings with such a People ‖; and thus to go through the little that is left to be done with as great Airs of Arrogance and Superiority as he can possibly assume. These are Accomplishments indeed not difficult to be found, and which we need not despair to meet with at *Arthur's*, or on the Turf.**

I do not, Sir, mean to insinuate, that the Demolition of *Dunkirk* is not an Object worthy of our Regard. It is indeed probably not of quite so much Importance, as you think it, and as formerly it was thought, whilst in the Continental Wars of King *William*, and Queen *Anne*, we neglected our Naval Strength, and the due Protection of our Trade. However, as it is still an Object, there is no doubt but in the ensuing Negotiation our Ministry will attend with proper Care to have it demolished, according to the Tenor of former Treaties. This, Sir, we may say with some Assurance, will be done. But that this be done before we condescend to treat; that it is to be a Preliminary to the Preliminaries of Peace, is an Idea altogether extravagant, and as little justified by Precedent as by Reason. That those very Matters for which War was declared should not be so much as mentioned in the Negotiation for Peace, is a Principle entirely your own, and to which all the Writers on Politics have to this Day been entirely Strangers. You seem indeed aware of this, and therefore assert, that such Demands as you propose †† “ cannot be looked upon

* P. 24. † P. 25. ‖ P. ib. ** P. 6.

†† Vid. p. 9. of the Letter.

“ as the Infolence of a Conqueror, but as the wife
 “ Foresight of a People, whom dear-bought Expe-
 “ rience hath taught the proper Way of doing it-
 “ self Justice.” For you observe some few Lines
 before, that we ought “ * to take every Method
 “ in our Power to *secure* the Observance of those
 “ Concessions they may make; and to insist upon
 “ their giving us such *Proofs of their Sincerity* be-
 “ fore any Negotiation is entered upon, as may
 “ give us some *Assurance*, that they *mean to be more*
 “ *faithful* to their *future Engagements*.” The Way
 you propose, then, of doing ourselves Justice, is to
 insist upon these Demands, as the Compliance with
 them by the *French* is supposed to be a Security for
 their adhering to the Treaty.

I should, Sir, most willingly concur with you
 in recommending any Method which might secure
 their Adherence to such Concessions as they shall
 make; which might draw from them any *real Proof*
of their Sincerity, or which would give us *some Assu-*
rance that they mean to be more faithful to their future
Engagements: But I have considered your Demand
 in every Light which I was capable of putting it;
 and after all, I am utterly unable to discover, if
France should submit to the humiliating Step you
 propose, what additional Security this will, or can
 give us, that she will keep the Peace that is to en-
 sue, whenever she shall find it her Interest to break
 it. This Step may indeed be a mortifying Confes-
 sion of her present Weakness, but can be no sort
 of Security for her future Faith.

So far from having any such Operation, there is
 all the Reason in the World to expect that it would
 produce quite the contrary Effect. A Nation which,
 through the Necessity of its Affairs, submits to
 Terms imposed, for no other Purpose than to insult

* Vid. p. 9. of the Letter.

her, seeks the first Opportunity to wipe off the Stain. She will not look upon such Engagements as a Treaty, but as an Oppression; and she will find a Sort of Excuse for the Infidelity of her Conduct in the Insolence of ours. Nations, like Men, often resent an Insult more than an Injury.

Unreasonable as this Demand may be, you however seem fond of it; for you again ask, "Can you have any Dealings with a Power, who, if he refuses this, at the very Time that he is treating, affords you such a manifest Proof that his Word is not to be relied upon, and that you cannot trust to the Execution of any Promises ever so solemnly made?"* Why not? You may, Sir, undoubtedly, have Dealings with such a Power, notwithstanding such a Refusal; because he only does what is extremely natural, and extremely reasonable, in refusing to destroy a Place which is of Use to him in War, before his Enemy has condescended to treat for Peace. You do not, sure, imagine, that any Nation is so ignorant and sottish as not to know, that the voluntary weakening its Hands before a Negotiation for Peace, is not the Way to secure it good Terms in that Negotiation; and that they may well refuse to comply with this ignominious and unsafe Condition, without manifesting any Intention of swerving from their Engagements. If it could be supposed for a Moment, that our Administration would adopt your System, might not *France*, in her Turn, ask, and very reasonably too, What Security we propose to give, if she should submit to this extraordinary previous Preliminary, that we shall, even then, consent, on our Side, to an equitable Peace? Or that this first unreasonable Demand may not be followed by others still more unreasonable, whilst we have any Thing to ask, or she any Thing left to

* Vid. p. 25. of the Letter.

give? To answer, *Vævillis*, would sound strangely. To answer otherwise, with Consistency, is impossible. And it must be allowed, that so extraordinary a Demand, previous to a Treaty, would be a very bad Omen of our Moderation in the framing it, A Compliance with it would indeed mortify the Enemy; but it would add nothing to our real Strength, whilst it would alarm every Nation near us, and assist *France* in exciting that Jealousy of the *British* naval Power, which she has for a long Time been labouring, with great Industry, and some Success, to infuse into all the Nations of *Europe*, and particularly into the maritime States. You have very well observed upon the Terror which was excited by the Power of *Lewis XIV.* and upon the general Confederacy against him, which was the Consequence of this Power: But you have forgot to add, that the insolent Use he made of his Greatness, alarmed as much, and provoked much more, than that enormous Power itself. It was indeed the true Cause of his Fall. Other Nations also may be thought too powerful; and they will be thought so, whenever they exercise their Power with Haughtiness. Without having Recourse to a * *Montesquieu*, perhaps, Sir, it may be found, that the *Roman*, the *Spanish*, and the *French* Grandeur, have owed their Declension to the same Cause: They had attained a greater Power than they had Wisdom sufficient to direct: For the Sake of gratifying the Passion of the Day, they lost Sight of their lasting Interest.

The utmost rational Aim of our Ambition ought to be, to possess a just Weight and Consideration in *Europe*; and that the Power of the Nation should be rather respectable than terrible. To effect this, it must not be employed invidiously: It must ope-

* P. 38. And perhaps it might, on Inquiry, be worthy of another *Montesquieu*, to assign the Causes of the Rise and Fall of the *French* Monarchy, &c.

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rate discreetly and quietly ; then it will be happily felt in its Effects, while it is little seen in violent Exertions. — The Genius and Disposition of Nations, as well as Men, is best discerned by the Use they make of Power. And therefore, my great Objection to this Part of your Plan, does not arise from the Nature of the Thing which you desire ; my Objection is to the Time and Manner in which you insist on having it done ; which is, as I apprehend, to ourselves of no Kind of Use, and therefore arrogant and unreasonable towards the Enemy.

After the Proposal concerning *Dunkirk*, you lay before the two great Men the other Parts of your Plan. And here you recommend it to them to display their Moderation, by giving up *Guadalupe*, *Senegal*, and *Goree* ; and their Wisdom, by keeping the Possession of every Part of *Canada*. To keep *Canada* is the Point you have principally at Heart : “ * This is the Point,” you say, “ invariably to be adhered to ; this is to be the *sine qua non* of the Peace ; and unless it is, we shall have a *treacherous and delusive Peace*.”

Before I examine the Justness of those Motives that make you so strenuously attached to this Object, and so indifferent to every other, I shall beg Leave to remark upon the Consequence you deduce from the Possibility that *Canada* will be given up, “ that we shall have a treacherous and delusive Peace.”

The Views which every State ought to have at the making of Peace, may be reduced to two.

1st, To attain those Objects for which they went to War. And,

2^{dly}, To receive some reasonable Indemnification for the Charges she has incurred in carrying it on.

* Vid. p. 34.

Without openly avowing some * *Views of Ambition*, no Nation can possibly claim more.

This admitted, Sir, I ask, upon the first Head, Whether the Possession of *Canada*, properly so called, was ever one of those Objects for which we began the War? Was it ever mentioned as such in any of our Memorials or Declarations, or in any national or public Act whatsoever?

The true Cause of the War, our real and indisputable Right, is well known. Our Claims were large enough for Possession, and for Security too. And will you say, Sir, that if, in the Beginning of these Troubles, *France*, influenced by a Dread of the Exertion of the *British* Power, had acknowledged these Claims, had given up *Nova Scotia*, or *Acadia*, with its ancient and true Boundaries, had demolished their Fort in the Province of *New York*, had removed themselves from the *Ohio*, and renounced all Claim to that Territory, and that, on those Concessions, the Ministry had then ceased from Hostilities, without acquiring, or even claiming *Canada*, will you say, that we should have had a treacherous and delusive Peace? You will hardly venture to assert, that we should. And is a Peace made after *France* has felt the Force of *Britain*, and submitted to that Force, to be more treacherous and delusive than if she had made it from an Apprehension only of the Consequences? Is a Peace to be treacherous and delusive, if we do not get, on that Peace, what we never claimed as our Right before the War? Is a Peace treacherous and delusive, that puts us in Possession of a Territory larger than several flourishing

* P. 4. of the Letter. As his Majesty entered into the War not from Views of Ambition.

P. 33. This Plan is perfectly agreeable to that Moderation expressed by his Majesty in his Speech. Ibid. The Possession of *Canada* is no View of Ambition.

Monarchies?

Monarchies? Is a Peace delusive and treacherous, only because something is left to the Enemy?

But you do not assert, that we have any original Right to *Canada*; nor do you say, that the Concession of those Boundaries which we have claimed, do not give us a vast Territory, and an advantageous Barrier. You go upon another, which is indeed the only Principle which you make Use of, but which you are of Opinion is so strong, * “ as to silence the *French* Plenipotentiaries, and to convince all *Europe* of the Justice of your Demand.”

“ Ask the *French* what Security they can give you, if we restore *Canada*, however restrained in its Boundaries, that they will not again begin to extend them at our Expence?”

The *French* Plenipotentiaries, Sir, must be very extraordinary Advocates to be silenced, and *Europe*, as extraordinary a Judge to be convinced by such an Argument. *France*, Sir, might answer, That she can give no such Security. No Nation, whilst independent, can give it. And therefore, no such Security should be desired. To desire the Enemy's whole Country, upon no other Principle, but that otherwise you cannot secure your own, is turning the Idea of mere Defence into the most dangerous of all Principles. It is leaving no Medium between Safety and Conquest. It is never to suppose yourself safe, whilst your Neighbour enjoys any Security. Indeed, such a Question, after the Matters disputed in the War have been adjusted, is an Avowal of such an unreasonable Ambition, that I trust you will never be seconded in it by any *English* Man, or *English* Minister. For it is a Question that extends infinitely in its Consequences; extends (for any thing I can see to the contrary), to the utter Destruction

* P. 3. of the Letter.

of Mankind. For whilst ever we have *France*, or any other Nation on our Borders, either in *Europe* or in *America*, we must, in the Nature of Things, have frequent Disputes and Wars with them; and we must suppose, at least, as often as we are successful, that the Enemy is in Fault; that is, we must suppose the Enemy had provoked us to take Arms, by the Violation of some Treaty, or by the Invasion of some undoubted Right. The Business of a Peace is, to adjust and to determine these Disputes: But after the Enemy has agreed to our original Demands, if we go on to demand Security for the Preservation of Peace, what less do we demand, than that they should yield themselves, bound Hand and Foot, up to our Mercy? Let our Borders be ever so extended, as long as we have any Nation near us, we must have the same Disputes, the same Wars, and we must demand, upon your Principle, the same Security at the Conclusion of a Peace.

There was a Nation indeed, which I am sure we resemble more in Courage than in Ambition and Injustice, which frequently used to demand such a Caution: And such a Caution they actually did require from the *Cartaginians*, when they intended it as a Preliminary to the utter Destruction of that People, and to the most notorious Breach of Faith upon their own Side. Their Pretence was exactly yours; that the Enemy was a Nation perfidious to a Proverb; a People whom no Treaty could bind. They used the *Punica*, in the same Manner that you do the *Gallica fides*. I need not inform you, Sir, what followed: And indeed it was impossible that such Principles and Pretensions could end in any Thing but the total Destruction of the vanquished.

I do not see why the Arguments you employ concerning a Security for a peaceable Behaviour in *Canada*, would not be equally cogent for calling for the same Security in *Europe*. They are our Neighbours,

bours, and dangerous ones, here as well as there. The *Low Countries, Lorrain, Alsace*, shew us that the *French* Monarchy has been, at least, as intent upon extending its Dominion in *Europe*, as it can be in *America*. We know that they have tried all the Methods of War, of Treaty, and of Marriages, to enlarge their dangerous Empire. But still, dreaded as they are in *Europe*, (and much more to be dreaded than ever they were in *America*), if we could be so happy to see, what I fear we never shall see, a Confederacy to reclaim their Usurpations, what would we say to the Insolence of those who, on your Principle, should demand all *France* as a Security, that they should not make the like Usurpations for the future?

But, Sir, our real Dependence for keeping *France*, or any other Nation, true to her Engagements, must not be in demanding Securities, which no Nation, whilst independent, can give, but on our own Strength, and our own Vigilance.

To say the Truth, we owe our Losses in *America* as much to our own Supineness as to the *French* Perfidy. Our Ministers have heretofore acted in regard to *America*, as if they expected, from a Magic in the Contract, that it would perform itself. They took no Steps to enforce it. But from the Wisdom and Vigour of our present Administration, I should expect another Conduct. As soon as *France* is happily reduced to cede us such Boundaries as may be thought proper to demand, the same Spirit that has conducted the War, will maintain the Terms of the Peace. Instead of living *France* at liberty to build Forts at her Discretion, *English* Forts will be raised at such Passes, as may at once make us respectable to the *French*, and to the *Indian* Nations. God forbid that we should depend on the Sincerity of our Enemy. Every wise Nation will rely on its own Watchfulness, and on its own Strength,

Strength, to maintain the Terms they oblige their Enemy to give them; and whoever expects any other Dependence, will find himself the Dupe.

To supply any Defect that may be in your own Authority to persuade this Measure, your favourite Measure of retaining *Canada*, you call in the Aid of our *American Colonies*; and tell us, "*Though Care should be taken to keep all that we have claimed, something more to be done, or our American Colonies will tell you, you have done nothing.*" On what Authority this is so positively asserted to be the Language of our *American Colonies*, you have not told us. I hope and believe that you have been misinformed. But if our *American Colonies* should be so absurd and ungrateful to tell us, after all the Blood and Treasure expended in their Cause, that we do nothing, if we do not make Conquests for them, they must be taught a Lesson of greater Moderation. If, with a Superiority of at least ten to one, with a vast and advantageous Barrier, with the proper Precautions to strengthen it, under the Protection of a great Naval Power, they cannot think themselves secure, they must blame their own Cowardice or Ignorance, and not the Measures of their Mother Country; who is bound to provide for their Happiness and Security, and not for their vain Ambition, or groundless Fears.

The Idea of securing yourself, only by having no other Nation near you, is, I admit, an Idea of *American* Extraction. It is the genuine Policy of Savages; and it is owing to this Policy, that *England* and *France* are able at this Day to dispute the Sovereignty of Deserts in *America*; to which neither of us would otherwise have had any right.

As we pretend no original Right to *Canada*, that we can very rationally secure ourselves in *North America* without the Possession of it, will, I apprehend, need very few Arguments to demonstrate.

I have already observed upon the vast Superiority of Men that we have there; such a Superiority, that I am always astonished when I think on the unaccountable Conduct that has ever made *France* an Enemy to be apprehended on that Continent. We are in *North America* not only a greater Naval, but a far greater Continental Power. Our Superiority in Point of Situation is no less visible. If, added to these Advantages, we acquire on a Peace all those important Ports and Communications, by which alone *Canada* became in any Degree dangerous to us, I cannot see why *Canada*, weakened, stripped, confined, and I may say, bound down, will not be infinitely in more Danger, in case of any Rupture between the two Nations, from our Colonies, than ours can be from it.

I can not help observing, that among all your Ideas of Security, and that in particular anxious as you are for the Security of *North America*, you shew little Regard to that of the *West Indies*. Our *Caribbee* Islands must be ever infinitely in greater Danger from *Guadaloupe*, than our *North American* Colonies can be from *Canada* circumscribed as it ought, and as it is presumed it will be. The *French* have a real Superiority in the *West Indies*, and they have once made it to be severely felt.

If, as it has been shewn, we may, beyond any rational Fear, secure ourselves without the invidious Possession of *Canada*, we can desire it in Preference to our other Conquests only on Account of its superior Value. Though you have not at all insisted on this, yet, lest this may be thought one of your Motives to that great Preference, and it is, sure, the best Motive you could have had, we will consider the Point somewhat at large, and this will bring us to the second of those leading Ideas, that ought to guide a Nation in a Treaty of Peace; that is, to acquire a proper Indemnification for the Expences of the

War. You are not one of the Number of those who think we ought to give up nothing in a Peace. You do not claim *Canada* on a Principle of Right. We have examined it on the Principle of Security; the only Question that now remains to be disputed between us is, Whether *Canada* be a better Indemnification for the Expences of the War, than all our other Conquests put together? for you give up all the rest with great Ease, and insist on this only.

Before we enter into a Comparison between the Value of our Acquisitions in the *West Indies* and those in *Canada*, I must beg leave to take some notice of your Reason, your only Reason, for giving up the Island of *Guadaloupe* *; “that we have already so many Sugar Islands of our own.” If any Argument could possibly be drawn from our having Abundance of Territory, surely it holds much more strongly with Regard to *North America*, where one of our Provinces alone has more Land than ours, and all the *French* Sugar Lands put together. If we have in the *West Indies* Land enough for Sugar, surely we have Land enough in *North America* for the far less valuable Commodities, which are produced on that vast Continent. On what Grounds you are pleased to think the keeping a great Sugar Island an Acquisition of little Consequence, I am unable to comprehend. You know, surely, that in one of our Islands, the greatest of them, we labour under a sort of Monopoly, and under other Disadvantages, hard, if not impossible to be remedied. You know that another Island, I mean *Barbadoes*, formerly

* P. 33. The Possession of *Guadaloupe*, an additional Sugar Island, when we have so many of our own, ought not to be insisted upon so strenuously as to make it a necessary Condition of the Peace; and though *Senegal* and *Goree* are of real Importance in the Slave and Gum Trades, our own *African* Settlements have hitherto supplied us with Slaves sufficient for our *American* Purposes.

one of our best, is at present much exhausted ; so that the Produce, and the Profit made on that Produce, diminishes daily ; and that the rest, except perhaps *Antigua*, are quite inconsiderable ; so inconsiderable, that the Islands, which as Dependents on *Guadaloupe* are scarce mentioned, are much more valuable. It was no sooner found that the King of *Denmark* was intent on settling the Island of *Santa Cruz*, than some considerable Planters immediately removed thither, and it is now almost wholly settled by the *English*. Many have actually Interests in *Martimico* ; and *Guadaloupe* was scarce taken, when our Planters flocked thither, and immediately made conditional * Purchases, sensible of the Superiority of this Island and the Defects of our own.

In consequence of those Wants, and Disadvantages, our Sugar Islands produce little more than what serves the Home-consumption ; and that too at a very advanced Price. From the foreign Market we have, before this War, been almost wholly excluded. *France* supplied all the Markets of *Europe*, and supplied them in a great Measure from the Produce of this very Island, which you esteem so lightly. When we consider Things in a commercial Light, it is the foreign Market which ought certainly to have the greatest Influence. Those who supply the Home-consumption purvey to our Luxury : Those who supply the foreign Market administer to our Wealth and to our Power.

To shew you, Sir, how much the Sugar-trade might contribute to the Wealth and Power of any Nation, by what it formerly did contribute to ours, and what for a long Time past it has contributed to

* I say *conditional*, because the Capitulation has rendered it impossible to make an absolute Purchase ; but they have already made Contracts to purchase, if the Island remains to us, and have taken possession of Plantations by virtue of such Contracts.

that of *France*, I will lay before you some Facts, which are, Sir, of a Nature infinitely more convincing than the warmest Sallies of the most lively Eloquence. About the Time of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, we supplied the greatest Part of the Sugar-consumption throughout *Europe*. *France*, far from contending with us in the foreign Market, took from us a great Part of what they used at home. From the Year 1715 to 1719, we exported, one Year with another, 12,580 Hogsheds of Sugar; but from 1719 to 1722, we fell to less than half; for we sent abroad but 9064 *communibus annis*. We continued regularly on the Decrease to 1739, in which Year our Sugar-export had fallen to 4078 Hogsheds. Since that Time, it has fallen almost to nothing. Now, let us turn the other Side, and view the Sugar-trade of *France* since the same Period, the Treaty of *Utrecht*. At that Time the *French* exported no Sugars. But mark, Sir, the Revolution in 1740, when the *British* Trade in that Article was in a manner annihilated: *France*, after serving her Home-consumption at a very easy Rate, exported no less than 80,000 Hogsheds of Sugar, which, with the Gains of the Commission, &c. was reputed to be worth to *France* more than a Million *Sterling*, to employ 40 Ton of Shipping, and 4000 Seamen, solely in bringing from the *West Indies* to *Europe*. These, Sir, are Facts that proclaim loudly the Advantage of those Islands to *France* whilst they were in her Possession; and declare no less strongly the Advantages which must accrue to *Britain*, if she could attain the Possession of one of the very best of them. Facts these that ought not to be passed lightly, until you can shew something like them in favour of the Plan you so warmly embrace; which cannot, I believe, be done. I therefore, Sir, cannot help thinking, that your Reasons for rejecting *Guadaloupe*, on the Principle of our having *Sugar-land enough*, are not
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near so strong, or the Matter so well weighed, as the Importance of the Question deserves.

But let us see what the Value of this *Canada* is, in Comparison of which you reject all our other Acquisitions.

Unluckily for your Argument, you yourself inform * us at your setting out, that the *French* set very little Value upon this Possession; and that they have even deliberated, whether it should not be entirely abandoned.

If, in the Hands of the *French*, who have no other Northern Colony, from whence to supply their Islands with Lumber, Corn, and Provision, *Canada* was of so very little Importance, what is it like to prove in ours, who have such immense Tracts so much more conveniently situated for that Trade; and who can easily supply five Times the Consumption of ours, theirs, and all the other *West India* Islands put together; and that too at a much easier Rate than they can possibly have these Things at from *Canada*? But I do not insist upon this Argument, though it is strong against you; because I do not believe that *France* has such a Disregard for this their only considerable Possession in *North America*. It is a great while since they thought of giving it up; and they are long convinced that it is of some Use to them, independent of their Hopes of encroaching on our Possessions. Ask those, Sir, who lately saw *Canada*, if it had the Face of a Colony which the Mother-country was weary of holding? I believe, Sir, they will tell you, that the Cultivation of the Lands, the Number and Neatness of the Houses, the warm Condition of the Inhabitants, by no Means seemed to imply, that they were neglected by *France*; but evinced rather, that this Colony was the Object of her very tender Concern.

* P. 30. and 33.

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There are, independent of the Opinion or Designs of *France*, many Reasons why we should not think *Canada* a valuable Exchange for our Conquest in the *West Indies*. *Canada*, situated in a cold Climate, produces no Commodity, except Furs and Skins, which she can exchange for the Commodities of *Europe*; and consequently she can have little Returns to make the *English* Merchant. We know what trifling Returns we have from some of our own very flourishing Colonies in *America*. The whole Trade of Furs and Skins, which *Canada* carried on with *France*, fell short, in its most flourishing State, of 140,000 a-year. The rest of their Produce, with regard to the Market of *Europe*, is as nothing. A very great Part of the Value of those Furs was returned from *France* in the Article of Brandy, without which, the Trade with the *Indians* for their Beaver and Deer Skins could not be carried on. But, as an *English* Plantation, *Canada* must supply itself, as all the other *English* Plantations do, with Rum; else they will be obliged entirely to relinquish the Fur and Peltry Trade, which is the only valuable Trade they have. But let it be considered, how they can come to the *West-India* Market from the Bottom of the River *St Laurence*, with the gross and cheap Article of Lumber and Corn, on a Footing with our Colonies, many of which are not three Weeks Sail from the *Leeward* Islands. They could neither trade with *Europe*, nor with the *West Indies*, with any tolerable Advantage; not with the *West Indies*, because they must be underfold in that Market; not with *Europe*, because, being so underfold, they cannot have the Rum that is necessary for the *Indian* Trade, which keeps up their Commerce with *Europe*.

Indeed, whilst *Canada* is in the Hands of *France*, the Skin-trade may be kept up so as to be an Object;

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ject; because the Return for those Commodities, brings back the Brandy with which they are purchased: and thus the Trade is kept alive by a continual Circulation. The bulkier Articles of Corn and Lumber may likewise continue a Branch of their Trade; because it is their Interest to support, by every Method, the Vent of these Articles in their *West Indies* in Preference to Foreigners. But *Canada*, in our Hands, can have no such Preference; and therefore, from its Situation, cannot be on an Equality in the *West-India* Market; and from which Market alone it is that they, as a *British* Possession, can derive the Spirits, or those Materials for Spirits, without which the Fur and Peltry, their only Trade, must certainly perish. These Principles appear to me so well grounded, that I think it no Presumption to prophesy, “if that Place should ever be ours, “the Fur-trade of *Canada* must inevitably come to “little or nothing in a few Years.”

But let us extend our View a little farther; let us suppose, that if, instead of aiming at the entire Possession of *North-America*, we confine ourselves to those Limits which we have always claimed there; and that *Canada* is restored to *France*, curtailed in such a Manner as to secure the *Ohio* Country, and the Communication of the Lakes. The Country to the Southward of Lake *Erie*, and near the *Ohio*, is the greatest *Indian* hunting Country in *North America*. If this Territory should remain with us on a Peace, it naturally draws to us all that Trade which depends upon the hunting of Deer and Beaver; and if this Country should be further secured to us, by the Possession of *Niagara*, which is a Post of infinite Importance, and entirely commands the great Lakes of *Erie* and *Ontario*, I cannot see how it is possible to keep the far greater Part of the Commerce of *North-America* out of our Hands. The *Indians* must every where be intercepted before they can

can arrive at the *French* Colony, even supposing (what can never be) that the *French* could entice them thither by selling cheaper than our Dealers.

Thus, without aiming at the total Possession of *Canada*, by establishing proper Limits, and by securing them properly, we may draw to ourselves a great Part of that Trade which must give *Canada* itself any Value, in the Eyes of a commercial Nation.

So that the Question, Sir, is not, Whether *Canada* extended to the Ocean by a Possession of the River *St John*, and a great Part of *Nova Scotia*, incroaching upon, and menacing *New York* and *New England*, commanding exclusively all the Lakes and Rivers; whether such a Country ought to be kept in preference to *Guadaloupe*, and our other Conquest? but, Whether *Canada*, stripped of these Advantages, and confined to its proper Bounds, confined to the *Northward* of those Lakes and Rivers, be a better Acquisition than our rich Conquest in the *West Indies*?

If we compare the Value of the Returns of *Canada*, even whilst it flourished most by its Incroachments upon us, with those of *Guadaloupe*, we shall find them in no Degree of Competition. The Fur-trade, whose Value is before mentioned, is its whole Trade to *Europe*. But *Guadaloupe*, besides the great Quantities of Sugars, Cotton, Indigo, Coffee, and Ginger, which it sends to market, carries on a Trade with the *Carracca's* and other Parts of the *Spanish* Main, which is a Trade wholly in the Manufactures of *Europe*, and the Returns for which, are almost wholly in ready Money. Without estimating the Land, the Houses, the Works, and the Goods in the Island, the Slaves, at the lowest Valuation, are worth upwards of one Million two hundred and fifty thousand Pounds *Sterling*. It is a known Fact, that they make more Sugar in *Guadaloupe*, than in any of our Islands, except *Jamaica*. This Branch alone,

lone, besides the Employment of so much Shipping, and so many Seamen, will produce clear 300,000 *per Annum* to our Merchants. For, having sufficient from our own Islands, to supply our Home-consumption, the whole Sugar-produce of *Guadaloupe* will be exported; and will consequently be so much clear Money to *Great Britain*. And, Sir, the whole Produce of *Canada*, though it were all exported from *England*, and exported completely *manufactured*, would not amount to the Value of that single Article *unmanufactured*; nor would it employ the one twentieth Part of the Shipping, and the Seamen. But this, though the largest, is not the only produce of *Guadaloupe*; Coffee, which in our islands is none, or a very inconsiderable Object, is there a very great one. They raise besides, great Quantities of *Indigo* and Cotton, which supply Materials for our best and most valuable Manufactures, and which employ many more hands than the Increase of the Hat-trade, proposed by the keeping *Canada*, can do. This island is capable, in our Hands, of being improved to double its present Value; whereas *Canada*, in our Hands, would not probably yield half what it did to *France*.

There is, Sir, one Argument I would use particularly to you, who are so strongly sensible of the Inconvenience *Dunkirk* is to us from its Situation: Surely there is not a single Word you say, in respect to *Dunkirk*, that does not hold as strongly in regard to *Guadaloupe*, situated in the very Heart of our *Leeward* Islands, and there infesting one of the most advantageous Branches of the *British* Commerce. It is not to be denied but that the *English* Coaster and the *London* Trader has suffered by the *Dunkirk* Privateers; but their Losses this War have not been near so considerable as that of the *West Indies*, and above all of the *North American* Traders, whose Interest, I believe, you will not dispute to be of some Importance. Ask, Sir, the *North American* Tra-

ders, ask the People of the *Leeward* Islands, what a vast security they thought it to their Trade, that *Guadaloupe* should be in our Hands? Our Islands were so annoyed from thence, that they scarce considered it in any other Light than as a Nest of Privateers: They were surpris'd on going there, to find a People richer than in any of our own Islands; and Land so much better than their own, that many of our rich Planters have already made * conditional Purchases there.

Not to confine our Views solely to a commercial Point, give me leave to mention one great Advantage that, in a political Light, may arise from our Possession of *Guadaloupe*. It is very well known, that the Hand of Government is heavy on the Protestants of *France*; many of these People are already established in this Island; and they have Connections of every Kind with those of their own Persuasion at home; and may we not hope and expect that this may be an Inducement to many others to make this their Retreat, and that the Colony may be enriched by them?

In short, Sir, in whatever Light you view the Island of *Guadaloupe*, you will find it a most valuable and a most desirable Object. Do you ask to deprive your enemy of an advantageous Post, from whence he might materially molest your Trade in Time of War? Do you wish to extend your Trade in Time of Peace, and to have a new Market for all your Manufactures? From being scarce able to supply the Home-consumption with Sugar, do you desire to be foremost at the foreign Market? This Island, Sir, of *Guadaloupe*, that you esteem so little, will answer all these Ends; Ends so material, that I trust, Sir,

* I say conditional, because the Capitulation rendered it impossible for them to make absolute Purchases; but they have possessed themselves of Plantations, by Contract, to purchase them if the Island remains to *Great Britain*.

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that the Stone you have rejected, will be made the Corner Stone in the Temple of Peace.

Therefore, Sir, I must repeat it, that I am not a little surpris'd that you should pass over, in a Manner so careless, and with such extreme Superficiality, a Point so very material and interesting as this, to tell us, that * "the Possession of *Guadaloupe*, an additional Sugar Island, when we have so many of our own, ought not to be so strenuously insisted upon, as to make it a necessary Condition of the Peace." Had you taken the Pains to inform yourself of the Facts necessary for making a Judgment on this Matter, or had you duly attended to them, you could not possibly have said, that it was not to be insisted upon, and in the same Breath assert, that, without *Canada*, we should have a treacherous and delusive Peace.

You say a great Deal, and with Reason, upon the Value of our † *North-American* Colonies, and the great Increase our Trade has had from that Quarter. But you pass by, with very little Notice, how much both the Trade of *England*, and the Trade of these very *North-American* Colonies, owes to the Islands.

You look upon these Islands only as an inferior dependent Part of the *British* Plantations, which you scarce think worth while to mention: But, because I think you are under some Mistake in this Point, in addition to those Reasons which have been given to shew the Preference of *Guadaloupe* in particular to *Canada*, there are some Facts which I beg Leave to submit to your Observation, concerning

* P. 33.

† If, notwithstanding our having lost several Branches of Commerce we formerly enjoyed in *Europe* and to the *Levant*, we have still more Commerce than ever, a greater Demand for our Manufactures, and a vast increase of our Shipping, what can this be owing to but to the Trade of our own *American* Colonies? Vid. the Letter.

Settlements on the Continent of *North America* and Plantations in the *West Indian* Islands. Though it may be a new Idea, I shall not hesitate to say, that an *Island Colony* is always more advantageous than a continental one, for the Mother-country.

The Inhabitants of the *West-Indian* Islands never consider themselves as at home there: They send their Children to the Mother-country for Education; they themselves make many Trips to the Mother-country to recover their Health, or enjoy their Fortunes. If they have Ambition, it is hither they come to gratify it. I need not, I suppose, observe to you, how many Gentlemen of the *West Indies* have Seats in the *British* House of Commons. I might, I believe, venture to say, there are very few who have inherited Plantations in any of our Islands, who have not had an *European* Education, or at least have not spent some Time in this Kingdom. Many who have Plantations, receive and spend the whole Profits of them here, without ever having even seen the *West Indies*. If the Commerce with the *West-Indian* Islands had even been, in some Respects, against us, this Circumstance alone would turn the Balance in our favour. But this, in Truth, is very far from being the Case. The Trade we carry on with that Part of the World is as happily circumstanced as Imagination could form it. The *West-India* Islands lie in a Climate different totally from ours. The natural Produce, therefore, interferes, in no Respect, with that of *England*. Their Produce is only such as the Taste and Turn of our Manners call for; but demand so strongly, that if we had them not from our own Colonies, we must purchase from Strangers. The Commerce between the Mother-country and a *West-Indian* Island is natural and easy. It needs, in no Respect, to be forced or managed: They are mutually formed for each other: Neither is there any sort of Fear, that the Islands in that Part
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of the World shall ever make this Commerce less easy or less advantageous. The extreme Dearness of Provision will never suffer them, how much soever they may be inclined, to set up any sort of Manufacture which may interfere with our Fabrics. So that these Colonies, by their very Nature, Situation, and Products, by what they have, and by what they want, are kept necessarily connected with and dependent upon *England*, and must ever be so, as long as we are able to protect them. Let us now examine, Sir, whether the greatest Part of the Plantations which we possess or desire in *North America*, can come in Competition with the Islands, either in the Advantages we derive from them, or in the Certainty of holding those Advantages for the Future. With regard to the Estates in *North America* spent in *England*, I may affirm, that from *Nova Scotia* to *Maryland* and *Virginia*, there are absolutely none; yet in this Tract are the four Provinces of *New England*, the great Countries of *New York*, *Pennsylvania*, and the two *Jerseys*, Places highly flourishing in Commerce, and abounding with People: Even to the Southward of this Line, there are few Estates either in Number or Value spent in *England*.

In *North America*, the Climate is not in general unfavourable to an *European* Constitution, and it is such in which men fond of rural Diversions may pass their Time agreeably. The truth is, though their Estates supply them with Plenty to live at home, they do not furnish Money enough to send them abroad. Excepting Proprietaries, I do not remember that this vast Continent supplies our House of Commons with one single Member.

To view the Continent of *America* in a commercial Light, the Produce of all the Northern Colonies is the same as that of *England*, Corn, and Cattle; and therefore, except for a few naval Stores, there is very little Trade from thence directly to *England*

England. Their own Commodities bear a very low Price; Goods carried from *Europe* bear a very high Price; and thus they are of necessity driven to set up Manufactures similar to those of *England*, in which they are favoured by the Plenty and Cheapness of Provisions. In fact, there are Manufactures of many Kinds in these Northern Colonies, that promise in a short Time to supply their Home-consumption. From *New England* they begin even to export some things manufactured, as Hats, for instance. In these Provinces they have Colleges and Academies for the Education of their Youth; and as they increase daily in People and in Industry, the Necessity of a Connection with *England*, with which they have no natural Intercourse by a Reciprocation of Wants, will continually diminish. But as they recede from the Sea, all these Causes will operate more strongly; they will have nothing to expect, they must live wholly on their own Labour, and in Process of Time will know little, inquire little, and care little about the Mother-country.

If, Sir, the people of our Colonies find no Check from *Canada*, they will extend themselves, almost without Bounds, into the Inland Parts. They are invited to it by the Pleasantry, the Fertility, and the Plenty of that Country; and they will increase infinitely from all Causes. What the Consequence will be, to have a numerous, hardy, independent People, possessed of a strong Country, communicating little, or not at all with *England*, I leave to your own Reflections. I hope we have not gone to these immense Expences, without any Idea of securing the Fruits of them to Posterity. If we have, I am sure we have acted with little Frugality or Foresight. This is indeed a Point that must be the constant Object of the Ministers Attention; but is not a fit Subject for a Discussion; I will therefore expatiate no farther on this Topic: I shall only observe, that
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by eagerly grasping at extensive Territory, we may run the Risk, and that perhaps in no very distant Period, of losing what we now possess. The Possession of *Canada*, far from being necessary to our Safety, may in its Consequence be even be dangerous. A Neighbour that keeps us in some Awe, is not always the worst of Neighbours. So that, far from sacrificing *Guadaloupe* to *Canada*, perhaps, if we might have *Canada* without any Sacrifice at all, we ought not to desire it. And, besides the Points to be considered between us and *France*, there are other Powers who will probably think themselves interested in the Decision of this Affair. There is a Balance of Power in *America* as well as in *Europe*, which will not be forgotten; and *this is a Point I should have expected would somewhat have engaged your Attention.*

With regard to *Senegal* and *Goree*, I concur with you in not making them the principal Object of our Negotiations at the Congress * for a Peace; but it is upon Principles very different from yours. You despise the *African* Trade, and that consistently enough, because you seem to lay little Weight on that of the *West Indies*, which is supported by it; but the Reduction of the Price of Slaves, the whole Trade of Gum thrown into our Hands, and the Increase of those of Gold and Ivory, would make even those Places a far better Purchase than *Canada*, as might, I think, be shewn without much Difficulty. But I do not insist upon it; because I think we ought to be as moderate in the Terms of Peace, as is consistent with a reasonable Indemnification, and because too I know, in the Nature of Things, that it

* P. 33. *Senegal* and *Goree*, though of real Importance in the Slave and Gum Trades, our own *African* Settlements have hitherto supplied us with Slaves sufficient for our *American* Purposes; and the Gum Trade is not perhaps of Consequence enough to make us amend for the annual Mortality which we already lament of our brave Countrymen to guard our *African* Conquests.

is impossible to retain all. In one word, I will not venture, Sir, to say, *we have a treacherous and delusive Peace*, unless the Peace is made in Conformity to my Ideas; for there may be Reasons that neither you, or I, Sir, can possibly be acquainted with, which may make this not proper to be insisted upon; but I will take upon me, Sir, to say, that if by this War we gain *Guadaloupe*, we gain as great an Acquisition as ever this Nation gained by any Treaty or any War; and if it is possible to retain this, we need not ask for more.

At a Congress, Sir, in the Face of that August Assembly, formed by the Representatives of the Christian World, we shall there exhibit ourselves in our real Character, and shew all the Powers of *Europe* what they are to expect from us, and how far they ought to wish the Continuance and Increase of our Greatness. Therefore any shew of arrogant Superiority, any unmeasurable Claim, any avaricious Grasping, though they may seem immediately to fall upon *France*, are in effect Menaces to every other Power. But if Moderation is necessary there, when the War is ended, and when we act as a Nation, how much more necessary is it to private Men, whilst the War still continues with that Uncertainty, which must always attend the most prosperous Fortune. You cannot forget, in this very Year, what an Aspect our Affairs in *Germany* wore, before the glorious Battle of *Minden*; and you cannot be ignorant how much this must have affected in a Negotiation for Peace. Things are not yet decided there; they look indeed favourable, but not favourable enough, either with Regard to his Majesty's Army, and still less with Regard to the King of *Prussia*, to entitle you to prescribe Terms in the Stile of a *Roman Dictator*, even if any Fortune could intitle you to do it. Let us, Sir, use a little Moderation in our happy Hour, that we may at all

all Events preserve an Uniformity of Conduct, and not act meanly, if, contrary to our Wishes, any reverse of Fortune should oblige us to be moderate. I should indeed think it the more necessary in you to have been so, as you have not, in my humble Opinion, chosen your Objects very properly. *France*, Sir, though beaten in all Quarters of the World, worsted both by Sea and Land; though the Credit of her Arms and her Finances are impaired, she is not yet totally ruined: nor, as I conceive, brought so low as she was in the War of *Queen Anne*. Yet, Sir, you will be pleased to remember, that by the haughty Demeanor, the unreasonable Expectations, the arrogant, I may say, ridiculous Demands of the Allies, the happy Hour for making Peace on the most advantageous Concessions was suffered to escape; until Faction had Time to raise its Head in *England*, the Posture of Affairs to change Abroad, and the Fortune of the War to vary in so many Particulars, that the Result of all our Success and Arrogance was—the Treaty of *Utrecht*. The *M. de Torcy's* Memoirs are a lively Picture of this Conduct and its Consequences.

I have, Sir, attentively, and I hope it will be allowed fairly, examined your principal Arguments. You will give me leave now to observe a little upon some Things of less Consequence, which lie detached from one another here and there in your Performance.

I respect the Zeal which you shew for the Interest of your Country; but I think that Zeal has transported you much too far in your Reflections on the Conduct and Capacities of our Nobility. If the Easiness of their Fortunes hurries many of them into a Life of Dissipation and Pleasure, that has always been the Case, because it is the natural Consequence of Youth and Affluence. This, if we may

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trust our Writers, was the Grievance of other Ages and other Countries as well as ours.

This War is principally, with Regard to us at least, it is an *American War*. When I consider this, I own my Eyes are involuntarily led, as I believe those of most Persons are, to the Few who from their Inclinations, their Studies, their Opportunities, and their Talents, are made perfectly Masters of the State and Interests of our Colonies. There cannot be many; therefore we cannot easily be mistaken. Nor can we, when we cast our eye on the noble Person to whom we owe the judicious Settlement of that Frontier-colony, whose Capital gratefully bears the Title of its Founder, by any Means despair of an able Plenipotentiary at a Congress, where, for the first Time, our own national Interest will be the principal Object of Negotiation.

I admire, Sir, with you, the noble Struggle which that great Prince, our Ally in this war, has made against such a Combination of great Powers as meant to destroy him. I could wish for his Virtues, and profess I almost expect from his Abilities, that he will still extricate himself from all the Toils that surround him.

It must, however, be remembered, that it is not to his Connection with us, that he owes his Distress. He has not, like the unhappy Prince of *Hesse*, lost his Country twice, by adhering firmly to *Great Britain*, in a Quarrel entirely *British*. We found him beset with Enemies, our Interests coincided, we made an Alliance, and I am sure he has already found in *Great Britain* a most useful Ally; and I believe he always will find in her an Ally faithful to her Engagements. But, Sir, there is a Bound to every Thing, * *Let us, in your own Words, learn for the future to prefer our own Interest to that of others; to proportion our Expences to the Continent*

* P. 42.

to the immediate Expences of our own Country, and never to assist a New Ally without remembering how much we did for our Old one, and what return we have had. We see plainly, Sir, by the Conduct of Great Britain at this Hour, that the Ministry is not inclined to let this Prince fall for want of a due Assistance; but, sure, while we assist him so materially in Europe, we are not bound to sacrifice our Interests in other Parts of the World. It may be a popular Doctrine; but I hope, it is not a Doctrine that will be received.

* Enthusiasm, Sir, is a noble Principle of Action; but good Sense and Knowledge only must direct the sole Business of a Negotiation. The Protestant Cause maintained itself before the King of Prussia was considered as its Protector; and I trust it will still be able to support itself independent of him; it will indeed always find a surer Support in the jarring Interest of the several Powers of Europe, which will certainly never cease, than in the Faith of any Prince, which will be always subject to Change.

The Circumstances of that famous † Opposition in our Parliament to which you allude, are indeed but little known. It is, however, a Period about which no man is uninquisitive. Your Description

* P. 40. 41. I would inculcate a *Doctrine* which I think will not be *unpopular*, and which therefore, I hope, will not be opposed by our Ministers, that *whatever Conquest* we have made, and *whatever Conquest* we may still make upon the French, except *North America*, which must be kept all our own, should be looked upon as given back to France for a valuable Consideration, if it can be the Means of extricating the King of Prussia from any unforeseen Distresses.

* P. 41. P. 35. *vide Note*. The true History of this Transaction here alluded to, may possibly some time or other appear; though, as yet, we are persuaded that the World knows very little of it.

of the Medley which composed that Opposition, is spirited, lively, and I doubt not, just: It you were yourself engaged in that Struggle, *when you had driven the common Enemy to the Wall*, whether you found it convenient at that Time to quit your Friends, or whether you thought yourself deserted by them, Time enough is now elapsed to have forgotten political Friendships, and perhaps too, to have worn out Party-resentments; and in an Age so fond of Anecdotes, and so curious in Characters, assuredly nothing will be more acceptable than a true History of that whole Transaction.

It was indeed no undesireable Time to have lived, when a Field was opened for every Man to display his Abilities, and exert his Talents; if we give the Reins to our Ambition, we should, Sir, regret that where *so many skilful Champions used formerly to engage and struggle for Victory, one Man should at this Day remain single in the Field of Battle*. But alas, Sir, however mortifying this may be to us as Men, surely as citizens we must rejoice that the great Man, to whose active Spirit we in a great Measure owe all our Glory, our Success, I had almost said our very Safety, can employ his whole Time against the Enemies of his Country, without giving a Moment's Care to provide for his own Safety. If we consider it in this Light, Sir, sure it must be a most pleasing Contemplation to think, that * "the Extinction of factious Opposition, the Unanimity of every Party, and the Acquiescence of every Connection, in whatever Scheme is proposed by his Majesty's Servants," *suffer the Speaker without the least Debate or Opposition to take the Chair, only to vote Millions, and levy Thousands*; † but these Millions are voted, and these Thousands are levied, for the Destruction of the Enemies of our Country.

* P. 2.

† Vid. the Letter.

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Have a little Patience however; we shall soon, I trust, Sir, have beat all our Enemies, and then we shall perhaps again have Leisure to quarrel among ourselves; we may then see more than one Champion in the Field; we may then lift under that Banner, which our Interest or our Passions may direct us to.

In the mean time, let us thank Providence for the present happy Situation of our Affairs. Every Man should, as far as he can, endeavour to continue that Acquiescence, to cherish that Concord and Union, which is indeed so advantageous to our Country; and every Head of a Party must in this have a share in our Acknowledgments for their Acquiescence.

But the two great Persons you address, at present engross the public Attention. The noble Lord has great Merit both to his Country and his Prince; his early Zeal cannot be forgotten. His extensive Influence, his personal Authority, exerted as they have been, and as I trust they always will be, for the good of his Country, will always challenge the good Opinion of his Countrymen. Nor will our Country forget to do justice to the active Spirit of that great Man, to whose unwearied Efforts *Great Britain* is so much indebted for her present Glory; to whom you and I, Sir, owe it, that in a War with such a Power of *France*, we now debate whether our Country should use Moderation. I mean not, Sir, to make any Comparison, for it is not now a Time to draw the nice Line between the Merits of great Men, or to ascertain exactly where the Merit of the one ends, and the other begins. Comparisons are always invidious and might at this time be hurtful, and tend to weaken the Bonds that unite so many in the Service of their Country.

It was no Spirit of Contradiction, Sir, that made me take the pains of answering your Letter; therefore as I canvass with Freedom those Points which appear to me to be mistaken, so with great Pleasure

I join Hands where I think what you say is just and reasonable. I agree with you intirely in your judgment of a place Bill, which would, I believe, be more effectual, if not made too violent in its first operation like an *Oliverian* self-denying Ordinance. Your judgment on Mediators is surely just and sensible; and we may believe the Ministry think so, who have not employed any Mediation, though they have offered Terms to their Enemy.

I might now ask yours and the public Indulgence for any Mistakes. I have not willingly perverted or misrepresented any thing. I do not pretend to the Credit of a Writer, but I have endeavoured to understand the Question I write upon, as I think every Man is bound to do who troubles the Public with his Opinions. If I am mistaken in what I advance, it does not much signify who the Author of wrong Notions may be. If my Opinions are well grounded, and my Remarks just, my Country may receive some Benefit from them; and if she receives a Benefit, it is of little Concern what Hand administers it.

I am, SIR,

Yours, &c. &c.

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